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Abstract
: Concern about the health impact of novel coronavirusBackground
SARS-CoV-2 has resulted in widespread enforced reductions in people’s
movement (“lockdowns”). However, there are increasing concerns about
the severe economic and wider societal consequences of these measures.
Some countries have begun to lift some of the rules on physical distancing
in a stepwise manner, with differences in what these “exit strategies” entail
and their timeframes. The aim of this work was to inform such exit
strategies by exploring the types of indoor and outdoor settings where
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been reported to occur and result in
clusters of cases. Identifying potential settings that result in transmission
clusters allows these to be kept under close surveillance and/or to remain
closed as part of strategies that aim to avoid a resurgence in transmission
following the lifting of lockdown measures.
: We performed a systematic review of available literature andMethods
media reports to find settings reported in peer reviewed articles and media
with these characteristics. These sources are curated and made available
in an editable online database.
: We found many examples of SARS-CoV-2 clusters linked to aResults
wide range of mostly indoor settings. Few reports came from schools, many
from households, and an increasing number were reported in hospitals and
elderly care settings across Europe.
 We identified possible places that are linked to clusters ofConclusions:
COVID-19 cases and could be closely monitored and/or remain closed in
the first instance following the progressive removal of lockdown restrictions.
However, in part due to the limits in surveillance capacities in many
settings, the gathering of information such as cluster sizes and attack rates
is limited in several ways: inherent recall bias, biased media reporting and
missing data.
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Introduction
The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, responsible for corona-
virus disease 2019 (COVID-19), was first identified in Wuhan, 
China at the end of 2019, and has since spread around the world 
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020). 
The capacity of the virus for human-to-human transmission, 
coupled with the lack of immunity in the population due to 
the novelty of SARS-CoV-2, has led to the implementation of 
severe reductions in people’s movements in an effort to reduce 
disease impact. These strong measures are broadly described as 
“lockdowns”. Due to the highly restrictive nature of lockdowns, 
and their impact on people’s health, wellbeing and finances, it is 
likely that such interventions cannot be sustained for prolonged 
periods of time, and will have to be lifted, at least to some extent, 
before an effective vaccine becomes available.
To successfully remove these lockdown restrictions while 
avoiding a resurgence in SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we must 
better understand in which types of settings the virus is most 
likely to be transmitted. Determining particular places that 
are linked to clusters of cases could reveal settings that are 
responsible for amplifying the heterogeneity in transmission 
that has been reported: potentially 80% of transmission is being 
caused by only 10% of infected individuals (Endo et al., 
2020). Notably, the difference in transmission risk between 
households and larger communal settings is unclear, as is the 
difference between indoor and outdoor transmission.
Quantifying these differences in transmission can be further 
facilitated by the fact that, in many countries now under 
lockdown, intensive contact tracing of imported cases was 
performed in the early stages of the epidemic, resulting in the 
detection of clusters of cases. This data, on the first detected 
clusters in a country, can give knowledge of the types of 
settings facilitating transmission before intensive social and 
physical distancing took place.
The aim of our work is therefore to gather information on 
reported clusters of COVID-19 cases to determine types of 
settings in which SARS-CoV-2 transmission occurred. This 
could inform post-lockdown strategies by identifying places 
which should be kept under close surveillance and/or should 
still remain closed to avoid a resurgence in transmission.
Methods
Outline
We searched for scientific literature and media articles 
detailing clusters of SARS-CoV-2 transmission (details below) 
and extracted data into a Google Sheets file (accessible at 
https://bit.ly/3ar39ky; archived as Underlying data (Leclerc 
et al., 2020)). We defined “settings” as sites where transmission 
was recorded resulting in a cluster of cases. We restricted our 
definition of “cluster” to the first-generation cases that acquired 
the infection due to transmission in a single specific setting at a 
specific time. For example, if a person was infected on a cruise 
ship, and later infected additional people after disembarking, 
we would not consider that the latter were part of that “cruise 
ship cluster”, since they were not infected on the ship. We 
recorded the country and further details about the type of 
setting, the numbers of primary and secondary cases in the 
cluster, cluster sizes, and attack rates. We defined a case as a 
person reported to be infected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus, 
regardless of symptoms.
Search strategy
References were found in three ways. Firstly, we performed a 
systematic literature review for COVID-19 clusters in PubMed 
on the 30th March 2020 (search term below). A total of 
67 papers were found. Two reviewers (GMK and QJL) performed 
data extraction into the online database. We chose to only 
search this database and use peer reviewed articles as a quality 
threshold. We included data from English abstracts (where 
possible), but otherwise excluded non-English publications.
PubMed search: (“COVID-19”[All Fields] OR “COVID-2019” 
[All Fields] OR “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
2”[Supplementary Concept] OR “severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2”[All Fields] OR “2019-nCoV”[All 
Fields] OR “SARS-CoV-2”[All Fields] OR “2019nCoV”[All 
Fields] OR ((“Wuhan”[All Fields] AND (“coronavirus” 
[MeSH Terms] OR “coronavirus”[All Fields])) AND 
(2019/12[PDAT] OR 2020[PDAT]))) AND cluster [All Fields]
Secondly, we used the online Google search engine to find 
media articles detailing settings of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
in general. We searched for combinations of either “COVID”, 
“COVID-19”, “COVID-2019”,”severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2”, “2019-nCoV”, “SARS-CoV-2”, “2019nCoV” 
or “coronavirus”, and the words “transmission cluster” (e.g. 
“COVID transmission cluster” or “SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
cluster”). We only included online articles in English. From the 
collated list of settings, we then performed a further search 
for transmission in each of these settings (week beginning 6th 
April 2020).
Thirdly, we investigated whether information on the settings 
in which the first 100 “transmission events” in countries with 
current COVID-19 outbreaks existed by searching for 
publicly available data sources. As substantial contact tracing 
often occurs early in an outbreak, any clusters linked to the 
first ~100 cases in countries outside China could give informa-
tion on the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the absence of any 
social distancing measures.
Cluster characteristics and setting definition
With the above data, we then aimed to estimate both the final 
(proportion of people in that setting who became infected) and 
secondary (proportion of contacts of one case who became 
infected) attack rates in each setting. These were previously 
identified as key metrics, particularly within households, to 
estimate whether transmission is driven by a relatively small 
number of high-risk contacts (Liu et al., 2020).
We defined a setting when several reports mentioned 
clusters linked to spaces with certain characteristics. For 
example, “Religious” includes churches and mosques, while 
“Public” here means public communal shared spaces such as 
markets or welfare centres. Where settings were a mixture of 
indoor and outdoor spaces, we used a mixed indoor/outdoor 
classification. 
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Results
We found evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmission clusters 
for 152 events, which we classified into 18 types of settings 
(Table 1 and Table 2). All the studies with relevant data are 
compiled in an online database (accessible at https://bit.ly/3ar39ky; 
see also Underlying data (Leclerc et al., 2020)). Many of the 
published reports with setting specific data came from China 
(40/152) and Singapore (52/152).
The vast majority of these clusters were associated with indoor 
settings (12/18). Large clusters, such as those linked to 
churches and ships, were infrequently reported. Almost all clus-
ters involved fewer than 100 cases (141/152), with the outliers 
being transmission in hospitals, elderly care, worker dormi-
tories, and ship settings. Religious venues provided a further 
setting with large cluster sizes: there were separate clusters 
in South Korea, France, India and Malaysia (Ananthalakshmi, 
2020; BBC, 2020; Salaün, 2020; Shin et al., 2020). In addi-
tion to these four clusters with more than 100 cases per cluster, 
we identified five further clusters, in different settings, with 
cluster sizes between 50 and 100: school (60 cases) (Ailworth 
& Berzon (2020)), sport (65 cases) (Korean Centre for Diease 
Control & Prevention, 2020), bar (80 cases) (Sim, 2020), 
shopping (87 cases) (Data Against COVID19 SG, 2020) and 
conference (89 cases) (Marcelo & O’brien, 2020).
We found a notably high number of transmission events reported 
in worker dormitories (21/152), although all of these were 
from Singapore. This type of setting had the second highest 
total cluster size out of all the recorded events we found, with 
797 cases reported in the S11 dormitory cluster in Singapore 
(Data Against COVID19 SG, 2020).
Table 1. Summary of gathered reported events as of 20th April 2020. Where only one study for this setting is reported, the 
minimum, maximum and median number of secondary cases in the cluster and/or total cluster size correspond to this single 
reported number (if given). Total cluster size accounts for all primary and secondary cases in the cluster. For references see the 
online database, accessible at https://bit.ly/3ar39ky.
Setting type
Number of 
reported 
events
Secondary cases Total cluster size
Countries
Indoor/outdoor
Min Median Max Min Median Max
Bar 8 2 9 16 3 10 80 Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Singapore, USA
Indoor
Building site 4 / / / 5 20.5 49 Singapore Outdoor
Conference 4 / / / 3 8.5 89 Canada, Japan, Singapore, USA Indoor
Elderly care 10 / / / 5 20 116 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Scotland, UK, USA
Indoor
Funeral 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 USA Indoor/outdoor
Hospital 8 1 4.5 14 2 10 118 China, Italy, Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan
Indoor
Hotel 2 / / / 3 5 7 Singapore Indoor
Household 29 1 3 8 2 4 9 China, Hong Kong, Italy, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam
Indoor
Meal 16 1 3 10 2 5 47 China, Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, USA, Vietnam
Indoor
Public 5 / / / 10 10 27 China, Japan Indoor/outdoor
Religious 13 1 2 3 2 10 71 China, Singapore, South Korea, 
US
Indoor/outdoor
School 3 / / / 8 26 60 Singapore, USA Indoor/outdoor
Ship 4 619 619 619 78 602.5 1081 Diamond Princess, Grand 
Princess, USS Theodore 
Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle 
aircraft carrier
Indoor
Shipyard 1 / / / 22 22 22 Singapore Indoor/outdoor
Shopping 7 5 10 19 7 13 87 China, Singapore Indoor
Sport 6 1 1 1 2 7.5 65 Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
Italy
Indoor/outdoor
Work 10 6 7 7 4 7.5 20 China, Germany, Singapore Indoor
Worker 
dormitories
21 / / / 3 24 797 Singapore Indoor
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Table 2. Definitions used for each of our transmission setting types. The definitions describe in what environment transmission was 
deemed to occur.
Transmission 
setting
Definition
Bar Indoor space such as a bar, club, pub, small live music venues etc. 
Building site Indoor or outdoor space where construction work takes place.
Conference Indoor professional event with many people interacting and meeting, shaking hands, eating together, team activities, etc.
Elderly Care Care homes for the elderly; includes staff and residents. Transmission can occur between staff and residents but 
also from visitors. 
Funeral Indoor or outdoor burial ceremony; includes close contact with others such as hugging, shaking hands, eating 
together, singing, praying, etc.
Hospital Any transmission that occurs within a hospital between patients and/or staff, in a COVID19 ward or not.
Hotel Any transmission that occurs within the hotel e.g. hotel rooms, shared spaces, reception desk, etc.
Household Transmission between individuals in a shared living space
Meal When people eat together. Meals included took place in restaurants, hotels, cafes, home, etc. Transmission occurs 
over a meal by speaking, sharing foods, touching the same surfaces, etc. 
Public Where transmission occurs on public property and does not fall into any of the other settings e.g. park, welfare 
centre, foodbank, etc.
Religious Transmission occurs at a religious event such as at? mass, services, prayer time, choir practice, etc.
School Childcare or learning environments (schools, nurseries, kindergartens etc). Includes staff and children. 
Ship Any ship at sea. Includes crew and/or passengers onboard. 
Shipyard Large indoor or outdoor space where ships are made or repaired. Includes those working on the ship as well as 
customers
Shopping A shop or shopping centre. Includes customers and those working in the shop. 
Sport Participation in a sporting activity indoor or outdoor e.g. gym or running.
Work In the workplace, typically an office. 
Worker dormitories A shared living space for workers.
We found only a small number of clusters linked to schools, 
and there the SARS-CoV-2 cases reported were most often in 
teachers or other staff. For example, for two school clusters in 
Singapore (Ministry of Health - Singapore, 2020), 16/26 and 
7/8 cases were staff. Some children were also found to be 
infected in these clusters, as was the case in the Salanter Akiba 
Riverdale school in New York, USA (Ailworth & Berzon 
(2020)), although testing for infection was not always universal.
The setting with the greatest number of reports of clusters of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission was households (29/152). Again, 
most were from China (19/29) with all cluster sizes being less 
than 10. However, for 20 out of 29 studies we were unable 
to calculate either the secondary or final attack rates due to a 
lack of information on total household size.
We aimed to estimate secondary and final attack rates in 
other settings but, as for households, we found that there was 
substantial missing data. In particular, the number of individuals 
in a setting was missing, and so we were unable to perform this 
analysis. Where attack rates could be estimated for individual 
clusters, these are reported in the online database.
Although information on the index and early cases in a setting 
was often reported, further information on the subsequently 
reported 10–100 cases in a country was difficult to extract. 
Moreover, the index cases were often quarantined and hence not 
linked to further transmission in most settings.
Discussion
In this review of SARS-CoV-2 transmission events, we found that 
clusters of cases were reported in many, predominantly indoor, 
settings. Most clusters involved fewer than 100 cases, with the 
exceptions being in healthcare (hospitals and elderly care), 
large religious gatherings and large co-habiting settings (worker 
dormitories and ships). Other settings with examples of 
clusters between 50–100 cases in size were schools, sport, bar, 
shopping and a conference. The majority of our reports are from 
China and Singapore.
Limitations
The settings collated here are biased due to the nature of our 
general search for SARS-CoV-2 transmission described 
above. Although based on a systematic review of published 
peer-reviewed literature, many of the reports included came from 
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media articles where relevant epidemiological quantities were 
not always reported, resulting in many missing data. Many of 
the more detailed studies originated from the early outbreak in 
China, especially those providing household information. Bias 
is present when relying on media coverage - a cluster is more 
likely to be reported if controversial or if there is an interest-
ing social narrative. This is then compounded by the method 
search engines use to provide results where priority is given to 
high traffic stories.
Similarly, there is a bias in our reports which means that 
attendance in settings with many individuals is more likely to be 
linked to a cluster: recall bias (Spencer et al., 2017). The accu-
racy of memories is influenced by subsequent events and expe-
riences such that special, one-off events may be more likely 
to be remembered and potentially reported. If multiple single 
transmission events had occurred whilst walking in a park, for 
example, these would be less likely to be remembered, and 
more difficult to detect and hence record. Networks of close 
contacts also tend to be small, resulting in multiple oppor-
tunities for transmission, and hence potentially increase the 
importance of households or workplace for transmission 
instead of single outstanding settings of potential transmission. 
Hence, we cannot determine with any reliability the relative 
importance of the reported different types of settings beyond the 
record that clusters have been linked to such places.
Other events, such as large music concert (Dalling, 2020), 
political (Jones, 2020) and sporting (Hope, 2020; Roan, 2020; 
Wood & Carroll, 2020) gatherings, could potentially have been 
linked to clusters of COVID-19. But, in the absence of rigor-
ous surveillance systems and widespread testing that would 
allow countries to link and report the transmissions of such 
events, such links remain speculation. The outlier in this 
is Singapore which has detailed contact tracing and a 
well-designed online dashboard with details of all clusters detected 
(Data Against COVID19 SG, 2020).
In many settings, only symptomatic cases of disease severe 
enough to require hospitalization are tested and ultimately 
reported. This misses those infections that result in mildly 
symptomatic or asymptomatic symptoms, although there is 
mounting evidence for a significant proportion of infections 
to remain asymptomatic (Gudbjartsson et al., 2020; He et al., 
2020; Lavezzo et al., 2020). For some of the clusters, pri-
marily households, all contacts were tested for infection; but 
for most of the data collated here, the number of COVID-19 
symptomatic cases was the only information provided. These 
reported cases are a subset of all infections and in the absence 
of more comprehensive data, such as could be collated 
through widespread contact tracing and community testing, we 
cannot conclude anything about clusters of infections, nor that 
we have included all relevant settings in which transmission 
can occur. We were also unable to estimate attack rates from 
the available data, meaning that comparison between rates of 
transmission in settings is impossible to achieve.
Settings associated with large cluster sizes
One type of setting that was associated with large numbers 
of eventual cases was religious venues. The common features 
of these meetings are the large number of attendees, confined 
spaces and physical contact. For example, there were eventu-
ally more than 5000 COVID-19 cases linked to transmission 
at the Shincheonji Church of Jesus in South Korea (Shin 
et al., 2020). In this particular religious venue, no preventative 
action was taken despite knowing members were infected with 
SARS-CoV-2. In other venues, transmission events took place 
without prior knowledge of any infections and before the 
WHO declared pandemic status. Other large clusters in this 
setting type were associated with annual religious events that 
took place over a few days or weeks (Ananthalakshmi, 2020; 
BBC, 2020; Salaün, 2020). Attendees returned to their home 
countries where they continued to transmit. This generated 
many secondary cases internationally as well as locally. 
However, it is clear from smaller “first-generation” clusters that 
these settings provide ideal conditions for transmission: we 
found 7/13 identified religious clusters had 10 cases or less, 
whilst 6/13 had 23 or more (see online database https://bit.
ly/3ar39ky and Underlying data (Leclerc et al., 2020) for 
more information). The number of cases in each cluster is an 
approximation, and little is known about the number of index 
cases in these religious meetings to begin with, with the 
exception of the South Korea cluster. Religious events are well 
known sources of heightened transmission; there is a focus 
on vaccination recommendations for attendees to the annual 
Hajj pilgrimage for example, which is currently being postponed 
for 2020 (Aljazeera, 2020).
Worker dormitories have been recognised as key places linked 
to transmission in Singapore, with 893 out of 942 new cases 
recorded on April 18th being residents in such dormitories 
(Asia, 2020). We found 21 reported clusters, one of which 
had the largest cluster size of all the events we report here; 
797 cases which from the data we believe is a first-generation 
cluster. Worker dormitories are similar to households (Dalling, 
2020) in the sense that they are places where people live 
together and come in frequent close contact; however, the 
number of residents in dormitories is higher than in most other 
households. This probably contributes to the higher cluster 
sizes seen in this setting. Additionally, hygiene facilities can be 
limited in worker dormitories (Paul et al., 2020), which could 
also explain the higher transmission. It would be beneficial to 
compare attack rates across households and worker dormito-
ries, to better understand which factors influence the risk of 
transmission between people who share a living space. Unfor-
tunately, we were unable to identify the total number of 
residents in these dormitories, which prevented us from deriving 
attack rates and making this comparison.
In addition to religious events and worker homes, we also 
identified clusters of more than 100 cases in elderly care 
homes, hospitals and ships. These are all known to be at risk of 
clusters of infectious disease (Blanco et al., 2019; Kak, 2015; 
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Lansbury et al., 2017). Moreover, people in these settings are 
often older than the general population and hence at greater 
risk of severe forms of COVID-19 disease (U.S Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2020).
We identified five additional setting types with cluster sizes 
above 50 cases (school, sport, bar, shopping and conference), 
which shared characteristics with the settings described above 
(see online database for more information https://bit.ly/3ar39ky 
and Underlying data (Leclerc et al., 2020)). Notably, sport, 
bars, shopping areas and conferences are predominantly indoor 
settings, where people are in close proximity. For conferences, 
like religious events, transmission within the cluster is facili-
tated by the duration of the events over several days, as well 
as the combination of interactions there (workshops, dinners 
etc…). As for bars and shopping areas, these are places with 
important fluxes of people, which increases the diversity of 
contacts. Finally, schools, like religious groups, can sometimes 
represent tightly knit communities which facilitates disease 
transmission amongst individuals, as was the case with the 
Salanter Akiba Riverdale school in New York, with a cluster 
size of at least 60 cases (Ailworth & Berzon (2020)).
The first 100 transmission events
The pursuit of the first 100 transmission events revealed l 
these early cases would have been performed by the country’s 
public health centres. These data may provide a clearer pic-
ture of early transmission but were not revealed in our search. 
Where we could find data on the early cases in a country, we 
considered onward local transmission from any of these 
cases including those that were imported. But we did not 
include cases which were imported infections unless a 
cluster of cases was linked to this setting. Further work could 
pursue the early contact tracing in a country to explore the 
relative importance of different settings to transmission. Impor-
tantly, this may counter a bias towards small cluster sizes: with 
a lack of follow-up only some of the cases actually linked to a 
setting may be reported and linked. Detailed contact tracing 
should also be explored to get information on the places 
where transmission is unlikely to have occurred, e.g. if a 
COVID-19 patient reports 30 contacts at place “A”, “B” and 
“C”, but only contacts in “C” subsequently become infected this 
reflects reduced risk in settings “A” and “B”.
Implications for further work
We found that many clusters of cases were linked to indoor 
settings, but this may be because early spread in China was 
during their winter, with people naturally spending more 
time inside close spaces. Increasing evidence suggests that 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 can be airborne (Morawska, 2020); 
however, it is likely that outdoor transmission risk is lower 
(Nishiura et al., 2020). Further work is needed to clarify this. 
We found only few clusters in school settings. However, there 
were many clusters associated with household transmission, and 
children could be the entry point for the virus into this setting. 
Although it should be noted in this context that the Report of 
the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 
“(COVID-19) did not find a single instance where people 
recalled transmission from a child to an adult (WHO-China 
Joint Mission Members, 2020). More generally, the role of 
children in widespread transmission of the virus is unclear, and 
whether reopening schools could trigger increased introduc-
tions of the virus into households and further within-household 
spread will have to be carefully monitored.
Further investigation of settings that facilitate clusters of trans-
mission could provide important information for containment 
strategies as countries lift some of the current restrictions. 
Previous work has suggested that there might be considerable 
heterogeneity in individual transmission, which would imply a 
disproportionate impact from preventing large transmission 
events from occurring (Endo et al., 2020). Whilst widespread 
contact tracing is often considered part of future containment 
strategies, this has usually been discussed in the context of 
following up individual contacts of someone who has been 
tested positive, whilst there might be gains to be made from 
tracing the settings where transmission has occurred. This 
could be particularly relevant in the context of contact tracing 
using mobile phone apps, which has recently been suggested in 
support of more traditional contact tracing (Ferretti et al., 
2020). For example, past co-location in certain settings could 
be a trigger for notification of risk from an app instead of, or in 
addition to, individual contacts.
Online database of collected reports
The online database (accessible at https://bit.ly/3ar39ky) 
provides information on all collected reports, references and 
information on cluster sizes as well as notes about the study. This 
database will be kept as a static source linked to this report, but 
with an additional tab for newly reported settings. Readers can 
submit information in the “Suggested updates” tab and we will 
aim to update information if evidence for substantial new clusters 
are found linked to a setting that was not in this study.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we found evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmis-
sion in many types of settings. Our results provide a basis to 
identify possible places that are linked to clusters of cases and 
could be closely monitored, for example by linking to app-based 
contact tracing, and/or remain closed in the first instance 
following the progressive removal of lockdown restrictions. 
However, reporting should be improved in the majority of 
settings, with implementation of systematic reporting on the 
number of potentially exposed individuals and the number of 
confirmed and suspected cases from these settings, to allow the 
estimation of attack rates.
Data availability
Underlying data
Figshare: COVID19 settings of transmission - collected reports data-
base. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12173343.v3 (Leclerc 
et al., 2020).
This project contains ‘COVID-19 settings of transmission - 
database.xlsx’, which contains the data extracted from the initial 
search.
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Up to date information on all collected reports is provided in 
an open-access online database (accessible at https://bit.
ly/3ar39ky).
This database provides references and information on cluster 
sizes as well as notes about the studies.
Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Zero “No rights reserved” data waiver (CC0 1.0 Public domain 
dedication).
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